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1. Introduction
Although the obesity phenomenon is more recent in Europe compared to the US, it does create equal concern given that
its prevalence has increased by 10–40% in most European countries over the last decade (WHO, 2003) and obesity levels
based on measured data already range from 13% to 23% (WHO, 2006). Even more worrisome is the spreading of obesity
among teenagers and children (WHO, 2006). Apart from being a debilitating condition, obesity is also related to numerous
health problems and many chronic diseases. In addition, obesity is not only a health but also an economic phenomenon
(Finkelstein et al., 2005).
The aim of this paper is to focus on the economic side of this phenomenon by examining the relationship between obesity
andwages in a cross-national perspective for Europe. So far, the literature on the relationship betweenweight andwages has
focused on two main research topics: on one side the socioeconomic determinants of overweight and obesity,1 on the other
side the costs associated with obesity. With respect to this last point, economists have identiﬁed two types of costs: direct
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The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between obesity and wages,
using data for nine countries from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) over
the period 1998–2001. We improve upon the existing literature by adopting a Quantile
Regression approach to characterize the heterogenous impact of obesity at different points
of the wage distribution. Our results show that (i) the evidence obtained from mean
regression and pooled analysis hides a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity as the
relationship between obesity and wages differs across countries and wages quantiles and
(ii) cultural, environmental or institutional settings do not seem to be able to explain
differences among countries, leaving room for a pure discriminatory effect hypothesis.
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and indirect costs. Generally speaking, direct costs include health care costs related to diagnostic and treatment services,
while indirect costs are related to the value of wages lost due to inability to work because of illness, as well as earnings lost
due to discrimination. This last aspect is the focus of our paper.
Starting with the pioneering work by Register and Williams (1990) several researchers have studied the existing
relationship between excess weight and labormarket outcomes.2 The vastmajority of empirical evidence produced by those
studies agrees with the view that, at individual level, obesity and labor outcomes (wage, occupation and labor force
participation) are negatively related, although this relationship may vary across population groups. If this is due to a pure, a
priori, discrimination of obese workers or it is, instead, the result of some economic relationship is still a matter of debate.
Fall in productivity levels (Cawley, 2000; Pagan and Davila, 1997), reduced training opportunities caused by physical
difﬁculties (Baum and Ford, 2004) and additional costs of the health insurance covered by the employers and charged on
wages (Bhattacharya and Bundorf, 2005) are among the main reasons used to explain such a negative correlation.
Although using individual data, all the evidence collected by this literature is based on a mean regression approach. This
represents a major shortcoming as researchers are not allowed to investigate the role of obesity at different points of the
wage distribution, and the observed average effectmay, indeed, hidemore complex behaviors. In fact, it could be that obesity
affects individual wage differently at the bottom or at the top of thewage distribution.3 For example, obesity could represent
a serious problem in all those contexts where a high level of interaction with the public is required or where an intense
physical activity is necessary. On the contrary, it may not represent a serious problem at high level of wages or, equivalently,
in all those cases where intellectual activity is needed. Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994),
appearance may count more than responsibility and managerial skills (although mainly for women) at the top of the wage
distribution. Therefore, by adopting a mean regression approach we could miss relevant pieces of information on individual
heterogeneity that may be extremely useful for a correct understanding of the phenomenon and for tailoring effective anti-
discrimination policies.
The aim of this research is to improve upon the existing literature on two main aspects. First, we adopt a quantile
regression approach, to investigate if and at what level of wages obesity represents a problem. Second, our analysis is based
on data from nine countries included in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), but differently frommost work
on this topicwe capture country heterogeneity bymodeling the relationship between obesity andwages country by country.
Our results show that the evidence obtained from mean regression and pooled analysis hides some heterogeneity as the
relationship between obesity and wages differs across wage quantiles and countries. Further, there is no evidence that the
results obtained can be related to existing differences in cultural, environmental or institutional settings across countries.
Finally, it is important to highlight that themajority of evidence collected so farmust be interpreted as statistical association
rather than as causal effect. Nevertheless, in the last part of the paper, we try to assess the causal effect by adopting an
instrumental variable strategy in the context of quantile regression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework and presents an overview of the literature
on the relationship between excess weight and the labor market outcome. Section 3 illustrates the data used and reports the
main descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy adopted and reports the econometric results. In
Section 5 we deal with the problem of endogeneity between wages and obesity and present some results based on
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) technique. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2. Empirical relationship between obesity and wages: background and literature review
Following Register and Williams (1990), Loh (1993) and Gortmaker et al. (1993) the relationship between wages and
weight has been usually modelled by means of the traditional human capital wage equation:
Wi;t ¼ b0 þ b1BMIi;t þjXi;t þ ei;t; for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T: (1)
where the subscript i refers to individual, t is time, BMI is the body mass index, deﬁned as individual weight (measured in
kilograms) divided by the square of height (measured in metres),4Xi;t is a ½NT  K matrix of time-varying explanatory
variables, e is the vector of residuals.
Based on Eq. (1) and using different data sets and estimation techniques, studies on the US data ﬁndmixed results on the
relationship between wages and obesity. In particular, Gortmaker et al. (1993) ﬁnd a negative relationship between wages
and obesity but no evidence to support the hypothesis that obesity differentials are confounded by health status, since
controlling for health status limitation does not change their results. Moreover, they reject the hypothesis that
socioeconomic origin or ability account for the obesity differential. Averett and Korenman (1996) ﬁnd that obese women
have lower family income with respect to non-obese women and that differences in economic status by BMI increase when
they use a lagged weight value or restrict the sample to womenwhowere single or childless when the weight was reported.
2 See among others Averett and Korenman (1996), Pagan and Davila (1997), Cawley (2000, 2004), Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005), Brunello and
d’Hombres (2007), Sousa (2005), and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006, 2007).
3 Similar concerns have been raised by Fahr (2006) who ﬁnds evidence that the body mass–wage relation is non-linear.
4 Although the vast majority of researches on obesity are based on BMI measures, the medical literature agrees that they are seriously ﬂawed because
they do not distinguish fat from fat-free mass such as muscle and bone. For an updated analysis of these issues see Burkhauser and Cawley (2008).
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Pagan and Davila (1997) ﬁnd that women pay a penalty for being obese due to labor market discrimination, while
overweightmales sort themselves into jobs, via occupationalmobility, to offset this penalty.5Conley and Glauber (2007) ﬁnd
that obesity is associated with a reduction in women’s wage and income by 18% and 25%, respectively, and a reduction in
women’s probability of marriage by 16%. These effects persist across the life course, affecting older women as well as
younger women. Baum and Ford (2004) ﬁnd that both men and women experience a persistent wage penalty over the ﬁrst
two decades of their career. Cawley (2000, 2004) ﬁnds that weight lowers wages for white women and that in absolute value
this reduction is equivalent to the wage effect of one year of education, two years of job tenure and three years of work
experience. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) show that the signiﬁcant negative relationship between adult BMI and wages
found in cross-sectional estimates reﬂects only a correlation between unmeasured earning endowment and BMI, and it
disappears when controlling for endowments common to monozygotic twins. Cawley and Danziger (2005) examine the
relationship betweenweight and labormarket outcome in a sample of current and formerwelfare recipients. They show that
after controlling for individual ﬁxed effects the estimates of the correlation of obesity and different labormarket outcomes is
not longer signiﬁcant.
Similarly, in the European context, there are country speciﬁc studies for England, Scotland, and Wales (Sargent and
Blanchﬂower, 1994), England (Morris, 2006, 2007), Germany (Cawley et al., 2005) and Denmark (Greve, 2007). Sargent and
Blanchﬂower (1994) ﬁnd no relationship between earning and obesity for men and a statistically signiﬁcant inverse
relationship between obesity and earnings for women. Morris (2006) shows that BMI has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on
occupational attainment for males and a negative and signiﬁcant effect for females. For Germany, Cawley et al. (2005) ﬁnd
that obesity is negatively associated with wages, both for men and women, when using OLS technique. However, once they
control for endogeneity using genetic factors, they conclude that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between weight and
wages. For Denmark, Greve (2007) ﬁnds a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between BMI and the probability to be
employed for women and a not insigniﬁcant relationship for men.
Europeanwide analyses have been conducted using pooled data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
by Sousa (2005), Brunello and d’Hombres (2007), Lundborg et al. (2007) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007). Country-by-country
European analysis has, instead, been done by Fahr (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006, 2007). Sousa (2005)
focuses on the impact of the BMI on labor force participation. She ﬁnds that being overweight decreases labor force
participation for women, but it increases labor force participation for men. However, she is not able to estimate the obesity
effect for each country separately, because using the propensity score matching approach reduces enormously the sample
size. Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact of obesity onwages independently of
gender for the pooled sample of countries. Furthermore, the negative relationship between obesity and wage is higher in
Southern Europe than in Northern Europe and the size of the effect of the BMI on wage depends on whether an individual
lives in an area with higher or lower than area’s average BMI, suggesting that local economic and social environment does
matter. Lundborg et al. (2007) analyze the effect of obesity on employment, hours worked and hourly wages in 10 European
countries for people aged 50 and above. Pooling all the countries, they ﬁnd that obesity is negatively associated with being
employed for both men and women and with female hourly wages. Moreover, when grouping the countries in Nordic,
Central and Southern, they ﬁnd that the effects of obesity on labor market outcomes differ across Europe. Sanz de Galdeano
(2007) focuses on the costs of obesity in terms of health, use of health care services and absenteeism. She ﬁnds that obesity is
negatively associated with health, especially for women and in Northern and Central European countries. Moreover, obesity
is shown to be positively associated with the demand for general practitioner and specialist services. Concerning the
relationship between obesity and absenteeism, obesewomen in some countries are found to be absent fromworkmore often
than healthy-weight women, while no signiﬁcant effect is found for men.
A main drawback of these studies is that they rely on a common effect of obesity on wages across the whole Europe or
country groups. As shown by Fahr (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006, 2007), allowing for country-by-country
analysis provides more insights into the relationship between wages and obesity. Fahr (2006) analyzes wage penalties
associateswithdeviation fromasocial normonBMI.Heestimates anequationwhere logofwages is regressedon twodummies
capturing the inﬂuence of a deviation from the social norm, and on two dummies that account for the inﬂuence of deviations
froman optimal BMI fromamedical point of view. Heﬁnds that deviations ofmore than three index points in bodymass in the
upward direction from the norm is sanctionedwith about 7%decrease in hourlywages in Austria, Greece and Spain. Garcia and
Quintana-Domeque (2007) showthat there isweakevidence thatobeseworkers aremore likely tobeunemployedor tend tobe
moresegregated inself-employment jobs thantheirnon-obesecounterparts.Moreover, theyﬁnd that the relationshipbetween
labor market outcomes and obesity is heterogeneous across countries and gender and it can be explained by the role of some
labor market institutions, such as collective bargaining and employer-provided health insurance.
Overall, two main lessons can be learned from this literature review: (i) the evidence gathered on the relationship
between wages and obesity is far from being conclusive; (ii) country heterogeneity plays an important role and further
analysis at country level or even at sub-region level should be undertaken whenever data are available. At the same
time, a major criticism to be raised is that all these ﬁndings are based on ‘‘mean’’ values over the wage distribution. As
also Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) have pointed out, average effect may, indeed, hide more complex behaviors.
Therefore, it is crucial to investigate the role of obesity at different points of the wage distribution, as it could be that
5 In this last case, male overweight workers choose jobs where they ﬁnd a productivity advantage over the non-obese or where they have a premium for
undertaking more employment related risks.
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obesity is related to individual wage differently at the bottom or at the top of the wage distribution. In what follows, we
ﬁll this gap by exploring the relationship between obesity and wages across countries and over the wage distribution
through quantile regression.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a dataset designed and
coordinated by Eurostat, the European Statistical Ofﬁce. The ECHP supplies a longitudinal panel of private households and
individuals across countries of the European Union over eight consecutive years, from 1994 to 2001, with a focus on
household income, living conditions, individual health, education and employment status.Moreover, the harmonized design
of the ECHP ensures a good level of comparison across countries and over time.6We only consider those countries (Denmark,
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland) and years (1998–2001) where information on weight
and height is available. As done in previous studies, we drop potential outliers by restricting the sample to include only
individuals with BMI above 15 and below 50. Moreover, we exclude pregnant women, andwe further restrict our analysis to
full-time dependent employees aged between 25 and 64 years.7,8
The dependent variable in our analysis is the log hourly wage for the respondent’s current job. In order tomake data from
different countries comparable, we converted nominal wage into real wage using the time-varying purchasing power parity
conversion index provided by the ECHP. Log wage is then regressed on a set of covariates such as a measure of obesity along
with a group of control variables like age, education, training, household compositions, health status (bad or good health
status), number of days absent from work, smoking habits, private or public sector of activity, occupation and sector of
activity, insurance paid by the employer, time and country dummies as control variables. These control covariates arewidely
used in wage models in order to control for systematic differences in observed characteristics between individuals, as some
of them may affect simultaneously weight and wages and their effects need to be netted out.9 Concerning our measure of
obesity, it is important to note that the standard speciﬁcation in this literature has been to assume a linear relationship
between the treatment and the outcome (see for example Brunello and d’Hombres, 2007), and the parameter associatedwith
this variable deﬁnes the effect of interest. However, as noted more recently by some researchers (Kline and Tobias, in press;
Shimokawa, 2008) this linearity assumption is not always credible. In fact, as also Kline and Tobias (in press) states, it may
happen that wages respond less to changes in the BMI for ‘‘underweight’’ or ‘‘normal’’ compared to ‘‘overweight’’ or ‘‘obese’’
individuals. In alternative, it can happen that underweight and overweight individuals experience similar wage penalties
generating an inverted U-shaped relationship between BMI and log wages. In all these situations standard linear treatment-
response models are unable to capture these more complex relationships. There are several ways to account for non-
linearities in the relationship betweenwages and BMI. Parametrically this can be done by including high order polinomials of
the variable of interest or by using categories (‘‘obese’’ vs. ‘‘non-obese’’ or ﬁner categories such as ‘‘underweight’’, ‘‘normal’’,
‘‘overweight’’ and ‘‘obese’’). An alternative is to adopt a non-parametric or semiparametric approach as recently done by
Kline and Tobias (in press) and Shimokawa (2008).
In our speciﬁc case the assumption of linearity has been rejected through a series of formal and informal tests. In
particular, (i) we run a RESET test that rejected the hypothesis of linearity of the continuous BMI variable and (ii) a graph
from an unconditional kernel regression that clearly shows how health care costs at individual level (proxied by the number
of visits to a GP) exhibit a discontinuity when the BMI is around 30 kg/m2, for both males and females.10 Based on this
evidence, our strategy is then to use a parametric approach with the BMI categorized in four dummies (standard clinical
classiﬁcations of BMI are underweight (BMI below 18.5), normal (BMI between 18.5 and 25), overweight (BMI between 25 and
30), and obese (BMI above 30)) with the normal weight as reference category. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the
individual BMI categories, by country and sex. Men are more likely to be overweight and obese than women: 44.7% and 9.9%
are, respectively, overweight and obese, compared to 22.4% and 7.1% for women. The prevalence of overweight and obesity
varies also across countries. The table also shows that about 10% of women in both Denmark and Finland are obese,
compared to 3.3% in Italy. Similar differences across countries exist also for men; in Spain the obesity rate is 12.8%, close to
that in Belgium and Finland (11% and 11.8%, respectively), and far from Italy’s rate (7.1%). Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A
report the full set of summary statistics for the pooled sample and by country.
6 For further details on the ECHP, see Peracchi (2002).
7 As noted by a referee, this age groupmay appear too broad as some individualsmay not be affected bywage penalties as they get close to the retirement
age. Individuals between 25 and 54 years of age should have higher perspectives in terms of career andwage opportunities (or penalties), and for this reason
could represent a more appropriate group for our analysis. However, empirical results do not change signiﬁcatively across the two age group selections. For
this reason we’d rather prefer to use the larger age group, given that by reducing the sample wemay incur in sample size problems, evenmore severe when
estimating quantile model at country level.
8 Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the selection procedure with the number of observations deleted in each step.
9 For example, for more educated people (and especially for women) education may have a negative inﬂuence on weight due to higher frequency of
weight monitoring (Wardle and Grifﬁth, 2001), different life-styles, lower intertemporal discount rates. Presence of children may be associated with
increase in weight and speciﬁc labor market outcomes (Lacobsen et al., 1999). Health problems are more frequent in obese people and they may also affect
labor market performance (Andreyeva et al., 2005), while smoking is negatively correlated with labor productivity but also with weight (Molarius et al.,
1997; Evans and Montgomery, 1994).
10 Graphs are not shown, but are available upon request from the authors.
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4. Ordinary least squares vs. quantile regression results
In this sectionwe report the results of the empirical analysis carried out. As ﬁrst step, we report the coefﬁcients of the BMI
classes obtained from OLS regressions for the pooled sample and for each country, by gender. The results are based on a
sample population aged between 25 and 64 years (Tables A.2 and A.3).
According to Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006) restricting our attention to this age group should help to reduce the
problem of measurement errors in BMI (difference between self-reported and objectively measured anthropometric
indicators). In fact, as also proved by Thomas and Frankenberg (2002), the difference between self-reported and objectively
measured BMI remains almost constant across individuals for people between 20 and 60, at least taking into account the
available evidence for the US. Although our age group is slightly different from the one considered by Thomas and
Frankenberg (2002), this should not represent a problem aswe have tested that our results remain unchanged once themore
restrictive sample based on individuals aged between 25 and 54 is used.11 Moreover, as measurement error does not need to
be the same across countries, country ﬁxed effects are included in the pooled estimate to capture such heterogeneity.
In Tables 2 and 3 coefﬁcients are reported under differentmodel speciﬁcations forwomen andmen, respectively.We start
by estimating a parsimonious model in column 1 (reference model) where we do not control for health status and
occupational dummies (but we control for all the covariates presented in Section 3), we then include only the health status
indicator in column 2, only the occupational dummies in column 3 and ﬁnally both set of variables in column 4 to assess the
robustness of the result to the inclusion of these potential endogenous variables. We propose this augmented speciﬁcation
procedure because as noticed by Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007), non-random sorting of individuals into different
occupations might lead to sample selection bias if obese workers are more likely to work in speciﬁc occupations. Similar
problemsmight arisewhen controlling for health status. For example, if obese individuals aremore likely to be hired towork
in occupations with lower wages, we might underestimate the effect of weight on wages after controlling for the
occupational variables.12 Looking at the results reported in Table 3, we can see that for men the coefﬁcients barely changes
across the different speciﬁcations, showing that the potential endogeneity problem associated with the health and
occupational variables does not affect the estimates. The results for women are slightly different (see Table 2). While the
inclusion of the health variable does not affect theweight coefﬁcients (column 2), controlling for the occupational categories
reduces the magnitude of the obesity coefﬁcient but only for the pooled sample and for Finland and Denmark. The
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of BMI, underweight, normal weight, overweight and obese
BMI (kg/m2) Underweight (%) Normal weight (%) Overweight (%) Obese (%)
Women
Full sample 23.73 3.71 66.84 22.38 7.06
Austria 23.47 3.95 67.54 22.72 5.80
Belgium 23.09 4.25 74.59 15.03 6.12
Denmark 24.40 1.97 61.68 25.88 10.47
Finland 24.58 1.37 60.97 27.23 10.43
Greece 23.73 2.30 66.90 24.50 5.61
Ireland 23.84 2.91 66.39 23.70 7.00
Italy 22.74 6.52 71.99 18.10 3.34
Portugal 24.42 3.02 62.30 25.57 9.11
Spain 23.06 5.22 72.65 16.95 5.18
Men
Full sample 25.75 0.39 44.97 44.70 9.94
Austria 25.65 0.04 48.45 41.56 9.94
Belgium 25.48 0.83 48.87 39.37 11.03
Denmark 25.56 0.64 46.95 42.60 9.81
Finland 25.95 0.24 44.04 43.94 11.78
Greece 26.09 0.19 38.45 52.67 8.70
Ireland 25.65 0.92 44.48 45.18 9.41
Italy 25.29 0.31 51.37 41.20 7.12
Portugal 25.85 0.27 43.42 46.61 9.69
Spain 26.20 0.46 38.87 47.84 12.83
Notes: Underweight, normal weight, overweight and obese workers are individuals with BMI lower than 18.5, between 18.5 and 25, between 25 and 30 and
over 30, respectively, as indicated by WHO.
11 Using the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), which contains measures of true and self-reported weight and height
(and therefore, BMI), to correct the self-reports of weight and height in the NLSY, Cawley (2004) shows that this does not seem to be a major problem. He
ﬁnds that even if women tend to underreport their weights but not their heights, using reported BMI instead of corrected BMI does not alter signiﬁcantly the
estimates. Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility to apply a similar correction due to the lack of data on truemeasures ofweight and height in Europe.
Moreover, Sanz deGaldeano (2007) has compared aggregate obesity rates based on objectivemeasures obtained by theWHOGlobal Database on BodyMass
Index with the corresponding ﬁgures derived from the ECHP self-reported information on height and weight. She ﬁnds that the correlation coefﬁcient
between the ECHP and theWHOGlobal Databasemeasures of obesity prevalence is reasonably high: 0.76 ( p<0:05) formen and 0.96 ( p<0:01) for women.
Similar results are obtained when computing the Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients.
12 We thank an anonimous referee for pointing this out.
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coefﬁcients for the other two categories of weight are almost constant. The result found for the group of women is
compatible with the ‘‘selection effect’’ found by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), for which heavier women are selected into
jobs requiring strength that are usually also less paid.13 However, it is important to note that thewage penalties do not seem
to be entirely explained by sorting of obese individuals into speciﬁc occupations and formany countries it does not affect the
estimated at all.
Table 2
OLS regression estimates, underweight, overweight and obesity coefﬁcients, pooled sample women (no obs. 30,313)
Women (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample
Obese 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05***
Overweight 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Underweight 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Austria
Obese 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.06 0.06 0.06** 0.06**
Belgium
Obese 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Overweight 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03*
Underweight 0.04 0.03 0.04* 0.04
Denmark
Obese 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05***
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
Finland
Obese 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Overweight 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Underweight 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Greece
Obese 0.05* 0.05 0.06** 0.05*
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ireland
Obese 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.04
Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underweight 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05
Italy
Obese 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Overweight 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Underweight 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
Portugal
Obese 0.06* 0.05 0.04 0.04
Overweight 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.03*
Underweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Spain
Obese 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.11***
Overweight 0.04** 0.04** 0.02 0.02
Underweight 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Notes: Model speciﬁcation in column (1) is the reference model as it does not include health status (bad or good health status) and occupational dummies
(Professionals, Clerks, Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations); in column (2) it includes only health status; in column (3) it includes
only occupational dummies; ﬁnally, model in column (4) includes both health status and occupational dummies. Control variables in all the speciﬁcations
include: country and time dummies, individual age, cohabitation status (living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household,
number of days absent from work, highest level of education completed (primary, secondary and tertiary), sector of activity (public or private), health
insurance status (whether the health insurance is provided by the employer), and sector (agriculture, industry and services). Estimates are obtained using
sampleweights. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for
each individual.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
13 Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007) use a dataset containing detailed information at job level within occupational categories based on the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT). Each occupational deﬁnition lists a title for the occupation, as well as a description of the occupation’s skill requirements and
demands. Unfortunately, if the ‘‘selection’’ interpretation is the correct one, we are convinced that the occupational variables, as available in the ECHP
dataset, do not allow to properly account for the heterogeneous impact of the BMI status on wages, given that this selection occurs differently across job
positions within the same occupation category. In turn, when controlling for occupational dummies the (true) effect of obesity on wages can be
underestimated, while not controlling for occupational variables may cause an even more serious problem with the overestimation of the same effect. In
this speciﬁc case, we decided to include occupational variables as this could at most provide an underestimation of our coefﬁcients, thus providing
prudential estimates of the effect of BMI on wages.
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Based on the above evidence, we adopt the speciﬁcation in column four as our reference model. Furthermore, as we are
particularly interested in the relationship between obesity and wages, in what follow we will discuss only the results
associated with the obesity coefﬁcient, having in mind that the other weight categories are included as controls in the
regression model. In order to allow for ﬂexibility, we have estimated the model separately for men and women and by
country. Furthermore, reported coefﬁcients are robust to adjustments for heteroskedasticity. For the pooled sample the
obesity coefﬁcient is negative forwomen (see Table 2) and positive formen (see Table 3), although statistically signiﬁcant (at
1%) only for women. This seems to suggest the existence of a wage penalty only for women at European level.
Country by country estimates provide a slightly different picture, showing the existence of some heterogeneity in the
relationship between wages and weight across European countries especially for men.14 Not for all countries in our dataset
women seem to suffer from awage penalty, given that in Austria and Belgium there is no evidence of an association between
wage and obesity. Furthermore, whenever this association is statistically signiﬁcant, the impact of thewage penalty is rather
Table 3
OLS regression estimates, underweight, overweight and obesity coefﬁcients, pooled sample men (no.obs. 47,374)
Men (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample
Obese 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Overweight 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Underweight 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11***
Austria
Obese 0.02 0.03 0.04*** 0.04***
Overweight 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Underweight 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.37***
Belgium
Obese 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Overweight 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Underweight 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Denmark
Obese 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.02
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02*
Underweight 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
Finland
Obese 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.28** 0.27** 0.30** 0.30**
Greece
Obese 0.04* 0.04 0.04** 0.04**
Overweight 0.02 0.02 0.03** 0.03**
Underweight 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08
Ireland
Obese 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18***
Italy
Obese 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01*
Underweight 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21***
Portugal
Obese 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Overweight 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.02*
Underweight 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01
Spain
Obese 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Overweight 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Underweight 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.11
Notes: Model speciﬁcation in column (1) is the reference model as it does not include health status (bad or good health status) and occupational dummies
(Professionals, Clerks, Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations); in column (2) it includes only health status; in column (3) it includes
only occupational dummies; ﬁnally, model in column (4) includes both health status and occupational dummies. Control variables include: country and
time dummies, individual age, cohabitation status (living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household, number of days absent from
work, highest level of education completed (primary, secondary and tertiary), sector of activity (public or private), health insurance status (whether the
health insurance is provided by the employer), and sector (agriculture, industry and services). Estimates are obtained using sample weights. Huber-White
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each individual.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
14 Our results are slightly different from those reported in Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007). This may depend from the different model speciﬁcation
adopted and from the sample selection procedure. Indeed, the conclusions remain very similar. We have not been able to compare our results with those of
Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) as the authors do not present OLS estimates.
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heterogeneous across countries, ranging from 5% in Denmark to 11% in Spain. As far as men are concerned, differences
among countries are even more striking. In fact, we observe three different clusters: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain which conﬁrm the result of no statistical association from the pooled sample, Greece and Italy which
show a wage penalty (4% and 5%, respectively) and, ﬁnally, Austria which records a wage premium (4%).15
As discussed in Section 2, the whole literature on the relationship between wage and obesity has been based on a mean
regression approach, which looks only at the role of obesity at the mean level of the wage, ignoring individual wage
heterogeneity. However, it could be that obesity affects individual wages differently across the wage distribution. A way to
overcome such limitation is to adopt a quantile regression approach that allows us to characterize the whole conditional
distribution of wage. Indeed, we may expect that in the lowest points of the wage distribution workers perform manual
activities that require effort and greater muscle mass. Similarly, in the highest points of the wage distribution intellectual
activity is needed and obesity may not represent an issue. In the ﬁrst case we should expect a positive effect of the obesity
coefﬁcient in the left tail of the wage distribution, while in the second case a not signiﬁcant effect in the right tail.
Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), appearance may count more than responsibility and
managerial skills at the top of the wage distribution (although mainly for women), and for this reason we might expect a
negative obesity coefﬁcient at least in the right tail of the wage distribution.
Tables 4 and 5 report the quantile regression estimates for the pooled sample, respectively, forwomen andmenwith both
health and occupational variables included.What emerges is thatwhile for women in Table 4 the QR estimates turn out to be
not very different from the estimates computed at the mean, for men in Table 5 the opposite holds. Moreover, the effect of
obesity for women is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% along the wage distribution, and in absolute terms slightly
lower on the tails of the distribution (4% at 15th, 25th and 85th percentile, respectively) compared to the central part (5%)
(the full set of results is available in Table A.4) .
Differently fromwomen, the effect of obesity for men is more heterogeneous across quantiles. In particular, men seem to
suffer from wage penalty due to obesity (2%) at 15th percentile, and enjoy a wage premium at (2%) at 50th and 75th
percentiles, while the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant in the remaining quantiles (see Table 5). These last results seem to
contradict both the ‘‘obesity as an asset’’ and the Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) ‘‘appearance theory’’ hypotheses.
Looking at country speciﬁc estimates in Table 6, the heterogeneity in the statistical association between wages and
obesity is even more pronounced. For women, in Ireland the wage penalty is found only in the left part of the wage
distribution, in Greece only at the median of the wage distribution, in Italy the relationship is characterized by a reversed U-
shaped curve with larger penalties on the tails. No regular patterns can be found in countries like Denmark, Finland and
Spain, although coefﬁcients vary quite a lot across quantiles (for example, in Finland, while the mean effect for women is
equal to 7:0%, using quantile regression the effect ranges from 10:0% at 15th percentile to 4:0% at 85th percentile. For
men the OLS results are not signiﬁcant, while the quantile estimates show a signiﬁcant penalty of 5% at 15th percentile). We
tested the differences of the coefﬁcients across quantiles. According to these tests we rejects the equality of most pair-wise
comparisons of the b s in some countries (exceptions are Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain), and in case of the pooledmodel
for almost all male coefﬁcients. This suggests two conclusions: (1) countries are different in terms of wage-obesity
relationship, and (2) within some countries the relationship between obesity and wage is different across quantiles.16 In
summary, these ﬁndings seem to suggest that it would bemisleading to ignore the heterogeneity of the obesity effect across
countries and along the wage distribution.
4.1. Are there alternative explanations to the statistical association between wage and obesity?
In the previous section we have found evidence of an important statistical association between wages and obesity.
However, as suggested by Baum and Ford (2004), it is important to understand to what extent this association could be
explained by one of the following three possible sources: (i) losses in productivity due to health problems; (ii) agents’ myopic
behavior; (iii) provision of health insurance by employers who discount higher health care costs for obese workers in the
form of lower wages. We expect that if differences in wages between obese and non-obese workers are due to one of the
above mentioned reasons, once controlled for them, the obesity coefﬁcient should become statistically insigniﬁcant.
Formally, to take into account the above mentioned hypotheses, we specify the model in the following way:
Wi;t ¼ b0 þS
4
j¼1b jBMI j;i;t þ gDi;t þ dDi;tBMI4;i;t þjXi;t þ ei;t; for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T (2)
where Di;t represents the variable of interest (productivity proxy, participation to training programs, and health insurance),
BMI4;i;t is the obesity category and BMI1;i;t , BMI2;i;t , and BMI3;i;t are underweight, normo-weight, and overweight categories,
respectively. Therefore, d is our parameter of interest. In this sectionwe test the signiﬁcance of these hypotheses. Results are
reported in Table 7.
15 In absolute values these percentages are not negligible. For example, given a coefﬁcient of 0.05 (as for women in the pooled sample), and assuming an
annual salary of 30,000 euros, the penalty effect amounts to about 125 euros per month. Slightly higher values are obtained at country level for some
countries (for example in Spain it reaches the highest value of 225 euros per month).
16 A table with the full list of pair-wise comparison tests is available upon request.
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4.1.1. Productivity hypothesis
In order to testwhether obeseworkers earn less than non-obeseworkers because they are less productive, we interact the
obesity dummywith a productivity proxy, namely the number of days of absence fromwork due to sickness. The ECHP asks
respondents to report the number of days they were absent fromwork during the last four working weeks because of illness
Table 5
Quantile regression estimates: pooled sample, men (no. obs. 47,374)
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Obese 0.02*** 0.00 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01
Overweight 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
Underweight 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.03
Union 3.86*** 3.63*** 3.05*** 2.67*** 2.48***
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09***
Sickness days 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.03* 0.02 0.00
Bad health status 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.05***
Age 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***
Age squared 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Private 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.01
Couple 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Children 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Secondary 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15***
Tertiary 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.36***
Smoker 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01*
Clerks 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16***
AgrFishery 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22***
Elementary 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.24***
Agriculture 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.14***
Industry 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Constant 0.54*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.32*** 0.39***
Note: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4
Quantile regressions estimates: pooled sample, women (no. obs. 30,313)
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Obese 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
Overweight 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
Underweight 0.03** 0.03** 0.01 0.02 0.02
Union 3.99*** 3.99*** 3.69*** 3.68*** 3.52***
Insurance 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Sickness days 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Bad health status 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04** 0.00
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Age squared 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Private 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06***
Couple 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01
Children 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03***
Secondary 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
Tertiary 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.41***
Smoker 0.01** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Clerks 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.20***
AgrFishery 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.39***
Elementary 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.35***
Agriculture 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.07**
Industry 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
Constant 0.58*** 0.38*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.09
Note: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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or other reasons. It should be noted that this measure includes absent episodes due to illness and to any other reason, so it is
not possible to isolate the impact of obesity-related illness episodes. Looking at Table 7, for the pooled sample we ﬁnd that
health limitations do not affect obese workers’ wages differently from non-obese workers’ and the obesity wage penalties
remain unchanged for both men and women (panel A). This suggests that obesity inﬂuences wages through a channel
different from productivity losses due to health limitations.17
4.1.2. Myopic behavior hypothesis
According to the agents’ myopic behavior hypothesis, obese workers heavily discount the future by caring less about
obesity-related health problems and invest less in human capital accumulation (less training), thus generating a ﬂatter wage
proﬁle.18 We test this hypothesis by interacting the obese dummy with the training dummy.19 The results (Panel B) show
that while investment in training signiﬁcantly increases wages for men and women, the interaction obesity-training is not
signiﬁcant for bothwomen andmen, while the obesity coefﬁcients are slightly lower at the tail of the distribution forwomen
and not signiﬁcant anymore in the center of the distribution (50th and 75th percentiles) for men with respect to our
referencemodel. This indicates that, at least forwomen, agents’ myopic behavior is notwhat drives the negative relationship
between weight and wages. On the contrary, for men by netting out the myopic behavior effect, the wage penalty due to
obesity in the center of the distribution disappears.20
4.1.3. Health care insurance costs hypothesis
Weinvestigatewhether the observedwagedifferential betweenobese andnon-obeseworkers inEuropean countries canbe
explained by the costs of health care insurance covered by the employer and charged on employees’ wage. We test this
hypothesis by interacting the obesity dummy with the health insurance dummy and we ﬁnd that the interaction coefﬁcient
is positive but not signiﬁcant both for men and women (Panel C). As found for men in the myopic behavior hypothesis,
controlling for health care insurance costs the negative association between wage and obesity disappears in the center of the
distribution,while for the female groupwecannotice a small increase in thewagepenalty in thebottompart of thedistribution
Table 6
Quantile regression estimates: obesity coefﬁcients by country
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Women
Austria 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07** 0.05*
Belgium 0.01 0.03 0.07** 0.01 0.00
Denmark 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06***
Finland 0.1*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04**
Greece 0.03 0.04 0.06** 0.00 0.01
Ireland 0.06** 0.05* 0.03** 0.00 0.01
Italy 0.06** 0.06** 0.03 0.05** 0.08***
Portugal 0.01 0.00 0.04* 0.03 0.03
Spain 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.1*** 0.11*** 0.11***
Men
Austria 0.02 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
Belgium 0.05** 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.02
Denmark 0.04** 0.03 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02
Finland 0.05*** 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Greece 0.04* 0.06*** 0.02 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06***
Italy 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02
Portugal 0.06*** 0.02 0.03* 0.04 0.04
Spain 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.00
Note: Coefﬁcients for underweight and overweight dummies are not shown. Control variables are as in Table 2.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
17 We should keep inmind that obesitymight affect productivity in ways that are not as easilymeasured. The negative effect of obesity on appearance, for
example, can affect conﬁdence and communication, thereby inﬂuencing productivity. Mobius and Rosenblat (2004) estimate that conﬁdence accounts for
approximately 20% of the beauty premium. Persico et al. (2004) hypothesize that height increases the chances that teenagers participate in social activities,
such as nonacademic clubs and sports. This participation, in turn, helps them to learn skills that are rewarded by employers andmight enhance productivity.
18 Komlos et al. (2004) discuss the role of time preference as determinant of obesity epidemic. Using the savings rate and consumer debt as indicators of
the rate of time preference, they ﬁnd some empirical evidence for the US and OECD countries conﬁrming the link between obesity and time preference.
19 It must be noted that, unfortunately, this variable does not allow to disentangle decisions to invest in training taken by employers and those taken by
employees, thus potentially weakening the possibility to discriminate between the myopic behavior hypothesis and the pure discrimination hypothesis.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
20 Baum and Ford (2004) use the experience variable as a proxy for engagement in training activities. Our data allow to use directly the variable training.
The ECHP does not provide a speciﬁc variable ‘‘years of experience on the labor market’’. It provides only the variable tenure (‘‘years of experience in the
current job’’), but this variable has a large number of missing data (about 9000 observations in the pooled sample). Therefore, we prefer not to use it.
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and a small reduction in top part. Overall, this result should not come as a surprise given that the countries in our sample are
characterized by universal coverage of health care services and that health insurance provided by the employer covers
additional services not included in the public insurance. As for the previous hypotheses, this ﬁnding seems to indicates that
health care insurance costs are not able to explain the negative relationship between weight and wages.
To complete this analysis, we have run a new model in which all these hypotheses have been considered jointly. Results
are reported in Panel D in Table 7.21 Concerningmen, we observe an increase in thewage penalty in the ﬁrst percentile, while
the coefﬁcients at the 50th and 75th percentiles loose their signiﬁcance. For women, we observe a small increase in thewage
penalty in the ﬁrst and third quantiles.
We ﬁnally test whether the obesity coefﬁcients in models with interactions (Panel D) and without are statistically
different andwe ﬁnd that none of them are statistically signiﬁcat at 5% level in the pooled sample. At country level, there are
very few cases in which the interaction terms change signiﬁcatively the obesity coefﬁcients in some quintiles.22 Given that
none of these hypotheses seem to be able to change substantially the signiﬁcance of the obesity coefﬁcients, our ﬁndings
Table 7
Quantile regression estimates with interactions, pooled sample
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Women
Base model
Obesity 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(Panel A) Baseþ sickness interaction
Obesity 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04**
Sickness days 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Obesity  sickness 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07
(Panel B) Baseþ training interaction
Obesity 0.03* 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Obesity  training 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
(Panel C) Baseþ insurance interaction
Obesity 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04** 0.03*
Insurance 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity  insurance 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
(Panel D) Baseþ all interactions
Obesity 0.05** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.03
Sickness days 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Insurance 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity  sickness 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05
Obesity  training 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Obesity  insurance 0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Men
Base model
Obesity 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01
(Panel A) Baseþ sickness interaction
Obesity 0.02*** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01
Sickness days 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.02 0.00
Obesity  sickness 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03
(Panel B) Baseþ training interaction
Obesity 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Obesity  training 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.02
(Panel C) Baseþ insurance interaction
Obesity 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity  insurance 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03* 0.02
(Panel D) Baseþ all interactions
Obesity 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Sickness days 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.02 0.00
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity  sickness 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03
Obesity  training 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.02
Obesity  insurance 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: Control variables are as in Table 2 plus underweight and overweight dummies.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
21 The full set of results with all other covariates and results country by country are available upon request.
22 The full set of results is available upon request.
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could suggest the existence of a pure discriminatory effect, although not conclusive in the sense we are not estimating a
causal effect.
4.2. The role of labor market institutions
As recently outlined by Freeman (2008), there is awidespread consensus on the fact that institutions have amajor impact
on the distribution of income. Among them, the presence of labor market institutions plays a major role in shaping it. Garcia
and Quintana-Domeque (2007) have studied this issue looking at how the presence of unions, their membership diffusion,
the level of bargaining coverage and at what level (centralized and/or coordinated) can affect the relationship between
obesity and wages. In this section we try to assess whether labor market institutions may help to understand the different
results obtained in terms of the relationship between obesity and wages across countries by means of three indicators of
labor market regulations: trade union density, bargaining governability, and degree of employment protection legislation
(EPL) as reported in Table A.5 in Appendix A. In particular, we expect that in countries with high levels of union density,
bargaining governability and EPL, where the wage setting is more controlled and employers and ﬁrms play a minor role in
the wage setting, the relationship between obesity and wages should not be signiﬁcant or small in size. Unfortunately, we
cannot empirically test these hypotheses in a regression framework for two main reasons: (i) the ECHP data set does not
provide union participation at individual level; (ii) data on level of union density, bargaining governability, and EPL are
obviously collected at country level and time invariant. However, we can provide an indirect evidence of the relationship
between labor market institutions and wage penalty differences across countries by means of Spearman correlation
coefﬁcients.23
Table 8 shows the ranking of countries according to the size of the obesity effect as obtained in Table 6. Twomain results
emerge from this table: (1) with few exceptions the signs of the correlation coefﬁcients are all negative, (2) correlations are
different across quantiles and across labor market institution indicators. A negative sign is a symptom that labor market
institutions foster the use of the obesity factor as a wage penalty, thus contrary to be the theoretical predictions. Negative
signs are recorded for women at almost all quantiles of the wage distribution and for all indicators. For men a positive sign is
found only for EPL at all points in the wage distribution. This last case seems to be the only one in our analysis where the
empirical analysis is in accordancewith the theoretical prediction. The highest value of the correlation is found for the lowest
quintile. Although obtained through a different methodology and adopting slightly different labor market indicators, these
results match, at least for women, those obtained by Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) on the same data.
5. Dealing with the endogeneity problem
As already discussed in previous sections, the results produced so far cannot be interpreted as causal relationship from
obesity towages. In an effort to add robustness to our previous results and to compare themwithwhat has been presented in
some of the literature so far, here below we replicate our analysis by employing an IV approach. In what follows we ﬁrst
review some of the main contributions in this ﬁeld and then present our estimation strategy based on Instrumental Variable
Quantile Regression (IVQR) and the results obtained.
5.1. The obesity endogeneity problem in the empirical literature
Standard OLS techniques may yield biased estimates of the relationship between wage and obesity for at least three
reasons. First, unobservable individual effects associated to genetic and non-genetic factors, such as ability and parental
background, might be correlated both with earnings and the respondent’s body mass index. Second, a problem of reverse
causalitymight exist. For instance, the quality and the quantity of foodmight determine how an individual behaves, her level
of productivity and inventiveness at work, and her earning potentialities, but, at the same time, individual working position
andwagesmight inﬂuence her quality and quantity of food. Finally, the BMI can bemeasuredwith errors, as researchers rely
on self-reported measures of weight and height.24 In this case, the error term is correlated with the variable of interest by
construction, generating inconsistent estimates.
Several studies have dealt with the endogeneity problem using alternative identiﬁcation strategies. Sargent and
Blanchﬂower (1994), Gortmaker et al. (1993), and Averett and Korenman (1996) address reverse causality by replacing the
contemporaneous BMI with its lagged value. However, the validity of this strategy relies on the hypothesis of independence
between the lagged BMI and the residual, which is unlikely to be true especially in presence of unobserved individual effects.
Baum and Ford (2004), Cawley (2004), Cawley and Danziger (2005) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007) use ﬁxed effect estimators
to control for unobservable individual effects. This identiﬁcation strategy does show some drawbacks. In particular, as also
23 Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) analyze the relationship between labor outcomes (employment and wage) and collective bargaining coverage
(the number of employees covered by a collective agreement over the total number of employees) through a simple graphical analysis, where they plot
labor market institutions indicators on the X-axis and obesity labor market outcomes on the Y-axis. They ﬁnd a positive association between collective
bargaining coverage and the probability of being unemployedwith respect to being employed for women, but no clear relationship for men. Moreover they
ﬁnd a strong positive association between collective bargaining coverage and wage gaps for women but no clear relationship for men.
24 See also footnote 10 for a discussion about this issue.
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noted by Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007), a ﬁxed effect strategy does not solve the reverse causality problem. In
addition, there is a clear trade-off between consistency of the estimates obtained with longer panel and plausibility of the
unobservables’ time invariance.
Many researchers have instead adopted an instrumental variable approach to deal with the problem of endogeneity,
using different instruments. Pagan and Davila (1997) choose as instrument indicators of health problems, such as self-
esteem and family poverty. Cawley (2000, 2004) adopts the BMI of ‘‘biological’’ family members (including parents’,
siblings’ and children’ body mass index) and Cawley et al. (2005) use the weight of a child or of a parent, under the
assumption that theBMIof a biological familymember doesnot affect the respondent’swagedirectly.Morris (2006) adopts
the average BMI and prevalence of obesity across individuals living in the same health authority area as instruments. Greve
(2007) uses information on whether the individuals’ parents have ever taken medication related to obesity or obesity-
related diseases (namely hypertension and Type 2 diabetes) and their mortality cause. Lundborg et al. (2007) choose as
instruments the presence of other obese persons in the household, being an oldest child, and having sisters only. Finally,
Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) solve the endogeneity problem by considering the ‘‘biological’’ BMI (computed as average
of all household members’ BMI) as instrument. The main drawback with the IV approach is that two conditions have to be
satisﬁed to ensure the validity of an instrument. It must be correlatedwith the endogenous variable and uncorrelatedwith
the outcome’s residuals. While the ﬁrst condition can be easily tested, with respect to the second condition only indirect
evidence can be provided given that no formal procedure exists to test for absence of correlation between the instrument
and wage residuals.
In order to overcome the difﬁculty of ﬁnding suitable instruments, Sousa (2005) uses a propensity score matching
approach. However, since this procedure implies to ﬁnd comparable individuals within the same dataset it might lead to
reduce enormously the sample size. A similar problem is found by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) and Conley and Glauber
(2007) when using information on siblings and twins to remove the common household effect due to both genetic and non-
genetic factors, given that the number of households with at least two children living in is limited and, therefore, it may
create problems of representativeness.
With the data in our hands, we believe that the IV approach is the most convincing (among those mentioned above) to
deal with the endogeneity problem, despite its drawback concerning the choice of instruments. In order to better understand
the limit of ‘‘biological’’ BMI we should notice that the residual of the wage Eq. (1) can be decomposed as:
ei;t ¼ Gi;t þ NGi;t þ ni;t (3)
where Gi;t is the genetic component, NGi;t is the non-genetic component and ni;t is a residual, i.i.d. over individuals and time.
Several studies reviewed in Cawley (2004) have shown that the correlation of weight within householdmembers is due
to genetic factors rather than to environmental inﬂuences. More speciﬁcally, according to Grilo and Pogue-Geile (1991),
environmental experiences shared among family members are not important in determining individual differences in
weight. Therefore it is unlikely that biological BMI (bBMI) is correlated with the unobserved non-genetic errors and it can
be safely assumed that CorrðbBMIi;t;NGi;tÞ ¼ 0. Unfortunately, the error terms of the wage and obesity equations could be
still correlated if unobservable genetic factors affecting individual earnings are correlated to transmitted genetic variation
in weight (CorrðbBMIi;t;Gi;tÞ 6¼0), although this event may not be very likely when analyzing labor market outcomes
(Cawley, 2004).
Ideally, the best strategy to control for unobserved genetic factors is to use same-sex siblings or twins’ weight as an
instrument. In practice, apart from the reduction in sample size mentioned above, it has some additional drawbacks: (i) it is
not possible, in all surveys, to identify siblings because they may have left the original households; (ii) in our speciﬁc case, it
is likely that if they live in the same household it is because they are still at school and/or not working, thus not useful for
identifying the relationship of interest.
Table 8
Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients by quantiles
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Women
Union density 0.092 0.125 0.217 0.125 0.358
Bargaining governability 0.476 0.131 0.036 0.452 0.298
EPL 0.325 0.35 0.05 0.025 0.025
Men
Union density 0.400 0.408 0.342 0.333 0.083
Bargaining governability 0.214 0.048 0.440 0.714 0.286
EPL 0.533 0.292 0.058 0.100 0.300
Note: Each cell in the table reports the Spearman correlation coefﬁcient between the obesity coefﬁcient for each quantile at country level and the
corresponding ranking for each labor market indicator. For example, the value reported at the cross between the 15th quantile and the row with union
density represents the Spearman correlation coefﬁcient between the obesity coefﬁcients recorded for each country in that quantile and the ranking of the
union density variable.
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Given the alternatives provided in the literature and the availability of the information included in the ECHP dataset, we
decide to use the ‘‘biological’’ BMI as instrument, as Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) proved to be reliable on the same
dataset. The ‘‘biological’’ BMI (from which we have derived the four categories—biological underweight, biological normo-
weight, biological overweight, and biological obese) averages out all the available individual body mass index of the family
members biologically related who completed the questionnaire.25 However, compared to previous studies we innovate by
adopting an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) approach.
5.2. The instrumental variable quantile approach
As discussed by Blundell and Powell (2003) and Lee (2007), there are three major alternative approaches to endogenous
quantile regression models, namely the instrumental variable (IV) approach (Hong and Tamer, 2003; Chen et al., 2003;
Honore´ andHu, 2004; Chernozhukov andHansen, 2005, 2006), the ﬁtted value approach (Amemiya, 1982; Powell, 1983), and
the control function approach (Chesher, 2003; Ma and Koenker, 2006; Blundell and Powell, 2005; Lee, 2007).26 In this paper,
we adopt an IV approach, following Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006), because their estimation approach is
computationally convenient to our speciﬁc purpose, simple to implement and it leads to a testing procedure which is robust
to the presence of week instruments.27 According to them, an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) model can
be described in formal terms as:
Y ¼ D0aðUÞ þ X0bðUÞ (4)
UjX; ZUniformð0;1Þ
D ¼ dðZ;X;VÞ (5)
Table 9
IV and IVQR regression estimates, obesity, overweight and underweight coefﬁcient
IV að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Women
Obesity 0.065* 0.144 0.066 0.154 0.156** 0.206**
Overweight 0.186* 0.196 0.411 0.195 0.317 0.216*
Underweight 0.129 1.478 2.593 1.674 4.152 3.011
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;10760Þ ¼ 17:17
Obesity equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;10760Þ ¼ 20:97
Overweight equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;10760Þ ¼ 12:92
Underweight equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
Men
Obesity 0.337** 0.559 0.566 0.384 0.224* 0.044**
Overweight 0.061 0.834 0.662 0.747 0.759* 0.602
Underweight 0.922 2.569 7.302 7.322 3.071 4.359
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;19276Þ ¼ 18:54
Obesity equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;19276Þ ¼ 19:38
Overweight equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
F-test ﬁrst stage Fð31;19276Þ ¼ 4:42
Underweight equation Prob> F ¼ 0:0000
Notes: Control variables include: time and country dummies, individual age, cohabitation status (living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve
in the household, health status (bad or good health status) number of days absent fromwork, highest level of education completed (primary, secondary and
tertiary), sector of activity (public or private), health insurance status (whether the health insurance is provided by the employer), sector (agriculture,
industry and services) and occupational category (Professionals, Clerks, Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations).
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
25 The choice of an instrument is often a matter of debate in the empirical literature especially for the impossibility of testing the validity of the exclusion
restrictions and we are aware that our instrument is far from perfect. In other words, average BMI for family members might affect individual wages not
only through individual BMI but also through other factors that enter directly into the wage regression, like education as correctly pointed out by one
referee. For instance, average BMI for family members might be related to average educational level for family members. In turn, average educational level
for family members is likely to pick up average ability for family members, which is related to individual ability. Therefore, individual ability is related to
individual wages. In this case, average BMI for family members would not satisfy the exclusion restriction. To check whether such a (speciﬁc) criticism is
relevant, we have performed we have also run the IVQR analysis controlling for average educational level for family members but the obesity coefﬁcients
results do not change quantitatively and qualitatively.
26 For an exhaustive review of endogenous quantile regression models and their differences see Lee (2007).
27 For more details see Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006), from which this section heavily draws.
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where V is statistically dependent on U
t 7!D0aðtÞ þ X0bðtÞ (6)
strictly increasing in t.
In these equations Y is the scalar outcome variable of interest (the log of the hourly wage), U is a scalar random variable
that aggregates all of the unobserved factors affecting the structural outcome equation,D is a vector of endogenous variables,
where V is a vector of unobserved disturbances determining D and correlated with U, Z is a vector of instrumental variables
independent from the disturbance U and correlated with D, X is a vector of included control variables. We refer to
Y  SY ðtjD;XÞ as the structural quantile equation. At the heart of the model is similarity, a generalization of rank invariance
assumption. The assumption of similarity states that given the information (Z, X, V) the expectation of U does not vary across
the endogenous state D. It is a key identiﬁcation device. From Eqs. (4)–(6), the event Y  SY ðtjD;XÞ is equivalent to the event
fU< tg. It follows from Eq. (4) that
P½Y  ðSY ðtjD;XÞjZ;X ¼ t (7)
Themoment equation given in (7) provides a statistical restriction that can be used to estimate the structural parameters
a and b. Eq. (7) is equivalent to the statement that 0 is the t th quantile of random variable Y  SYðtjD;XÞ conditional on
ðZ;XÞ:
0 ¼ QYSY ðtjD;XÞðtjZ;XÞ (8)
for each t. We want to ﬁnd an SðtjD;XÞ such that 0 is the solution to the quantile regression of Y  SY ðtjD;XÞ on ðZ;XÞ:
0 ¼ arg min
f 2 ðFÞ
Ert ½ðY  SY ðtjD;XÞ  f ðZ;XÞÞ; (9)
where F is the class of measurable functions of ðX; ZÞ.
Considering a ﬁnite sample analog for the above procedure, the conventional quantile regression objective function can
be deﬁned as
Qnðt;a;b;gÞ :¼
1
n
Xn
i¼1
rtðYi  D0ia X0ib Z0igÞVi (10)
where D is a dimðaÞ-vector of endogenous variables, X is a dimðbÞ-vector of exogenous explanatory variables, Zið f ðXi; ZiÞÞ
is a dimðgÞ-vector of instrumental variables such that dimðgÞ ðdimðaÞÞ. We set Vi ¼ 1. To ﬁnd an estimate for aðtÞ, we will
look for a value a that makes the coefﬁcient on the instrumental variable gˆða; tÞ as close to 0 as possible. Formally, let
aˆðtÞ ¼ arg inf
a2 ðAÞ
½WnðaÞ; WnðaÞ :¼n½gˆða; tÞ0AˆðaÞ½gˆða; tÞ (11)
AðaÞ is set equal to the inverse of the asymptotic covariancematrix of ﬃﬃﬃnp ðgˆða; tÞ  gða; tÞ, whereWnðaÞ is theWald statistic
for testing gða; tÞ ¼ 0. The parameter estimates are then given by uˆðtÞ :¼ðaˆðtÞ; bˆðtÞÞ : ðaˆðtÞ; bˆðaˆðtÞ; tÞÞ. In practice, for each
probability index t of interest, a and b are computed as follows. First deﬁne a set of values a j, j ¼ 1; . . . ; J, and run the
ordinary quantile regression of Yi  D0ia j on Xi and Zi to obtain coefﬁcients bˆða j; tÞ and gˆða j; tÞ. Then save the inverse of the
variance–covariance matrix of gˆða j; tÞ to use as Aˆða jÞ in Wnða jÞ, that becomes a Wald statistic for testing gða j; tÞ ¼ 0.
Finally, choose the value aˆðtÞ that minimizes WnðaÞ. The estimate of bðtÞ is then given by bˆðaˆðtÞ; tÞ.
Table 10
Quantile regression estimates for the restricted sample: obesity, overweight and underweight coefﬁcients
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Women
Obesity 0.051* 0.064** 0.060*** 0.053** 0.020
Overweight 0.001 0.017* 0.020** 0.027** 0.023*
Underweight 0.033 0.026 0.019 0.040 0.010
Men
Obesity 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.020
Overweight 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.036***
Underweight 0.001 0.039 0.036 0.052 0.088
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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5.3. Results from the IV quantile regression approach
In Table 9 we report the IV (column 1) and IVQR (columns 2–6) estimates for the pooled sample, for which the values
of the F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression, for both male and
females, pass the threshold value of 10 (as the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock, 1997). At country level
the situation is, instead, more problematic, given that for both samples the instruments turned out to be weak. We
therefore decided not to report them.28 First of all, we note that the IV obesity coefﬁcients (column 1) are negative for
both male and female, even if for male the effect is much larger in size. But if we look at the effect of obesity over the
entire wage distribution, the story is much different, in that the negative effect is found only in the highest quantiles for
both the samples. Moreover, if we compare the IVQR and the QR coefﬁcients, interesting differences emerge or show
up. . .. The obesity estimate for women is signiﬁcant and very large in size (15–20%) only in the highest quantile, while it
was signiﬁcant all along the distribution and much lower in the QR case. Similarly, striking differences also appear
between QR and IVQR for men. In fact, while in the QR case the obesity penalty was signiﬁcant below the 25th
percentile, in the IVQR approach it turns out to be signiﬁcant starting at the 75th percentile. When we tested for the
difference between the QR and IVQR coefﬁcents we failed to reject the equality between the QR and the IVQR estimates
(available upon request from the authors), apart for the 25th quantile in the male sample where the difference is
signiﬁcant at 5%. However, it is hard to say if it depends on lack of differences among coefﬁcients or on large standard
errors.29 For this reason, we keep on investigating the possible reasons for the difference between QR and IVQR
coefﬁcients.
The differences between QR and IVQR estimates may arise from the combination of two sources. The ﬁrst, and most
obvious, has to do with the reduction of the sample size, due to the construction of the instrument (see Table A.1 in
Appendix A). The second has to do with the different estimation technique (QR vs. IVQR). In order to separate these two
effects, we have ﬁrst compared the QR estimates based on the unrestricted sample with the QR estimates based on the
restricted sample and then these latter with the IVQR estimates. As expected, comparing the unrestricted QR estimates (see
Tables 4 and 5) with the restricted QR estimates reported in Table 10 we can see that selection bias determines sizeable
differences both in magnitude and signiﬁcance across the two samples.
In fact, it must be noticed that in the case of single households with deceased parents, couples with no
children, couples with children aged less than sixteen, or households whose components are not biologically related
(step, adopted and foster child, son and daughter in law, or just household’s components not related), it is not
possible to calculate the biological BMI and thus these observations need to be excluded from the sample. In our
speciﬁc case, this procedure leads to a sharp reduction of the observations from 77,687 to 30,100.30 As noted by Brunello
and d’Hombres (2007) this could lead to select a non-random sample of the population. Indeed, comparing the
initial sample to the restricted sample we actually ﬁnd that, while the average BMI in the two samples is very
close, individuals in the restricted sample are on average younger, less educated, with lower average wage and
belong to larger households. Moreover, individuals in Southern Europe countries have a higher probability of being
included in the restricted sample because these countries are characterized by larger household size with respect
to Northern Europe countries.31 Finally, comparing the IVQR estimates reported in Table 9 with the QR estimates
for the restriced sample in Table 10, we can see that the differences in the coefﬁcient estimates are stressed even
further.
In conclusion, in light of this lack of robustness in the estimates, the concern around the instrument adopted, and the
impossibility to statistically prove that QR and IVQR estimates are different, we suggest caution when interpreting the
relationship between obesity and wages as causal in the ECHP data.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the statistical association between obesity andwages along thewage distribution and,
contrary to most work on this topic, we have taken care of the existing country heterogeneity by modeling the relationship
between obesity and wages country by country. In the ﬁrst part of the paper we have produced evidence of a negative
statistical relationship, computed at the mean, between wages and obesity, and that this relationship is far from being
28 The full set of results is available upon request.
29 Wehave used the following strategy. According to these results (available upon request from the authors)we have ﬁrst computedbQR andbIVQR for each
quantile and boostrappedM times. Then, for each bootstrap value we have computed (i) the difference (bQR;m  bIVQR;m), (ii) the standard deviation of these
M differences and (iii) have applied the formula: ðbQR;m  bIVQR;mÞ=sdðbIVQR;m  bIVQR;mÞ. This procedure has been replicated for each quintile.
30 See Table A.1 for the selection procedure. Descriptive statistics of the reduced sample are available upon request.
31 Unfortunately, testing for selection bias is not an easy task when using IVQR, nor it is always possible to test for it. In fact, the standard two-step
approach suggested byWooldridge (2002) and applied by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) cannot be adopted in the IVQR framework. A possible alternative
could be represented by a test proposed by Buchinsky (2001), but unfortunately it relies on the assumption that the vector of Xs is uncorrelated with the
error term. This represents a strong assumption in our context, given that it remains valid only if quantiles are parallel (or, equivalently, that the b s are
equal across quantiles) as proven by Melly and Huber (2007). The test we have carried out rejects the equality of most pair-wise comparisons of the b s
(results are available upon requests) in many countries (exceptions are Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain), and in case of the pooled model for almost all
male coefﬁcients. Based on these results, we decided not to test for selection bias.
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homogeneous across countries and acrosswage quantiles. These results show that themean and quantile approaches lead to
different interpretation of the phenomenon under scrutiny, partly in linewith the results obtained by Fahr (2006) and Garcia
and Quintana-Domeque (2007).
Considering the pooled data, the relationship seems to be negative and signiﬁcant all over the distribution forwomen and
negative and signiﬁcant only in the bottom part of the distribution for men, suggesting that males with less rewarding jobs
are alsomore hit by obesity status. Furthermore, it was not possible to identify common patterns across countries that could
be interpreted as environmental, cultural or institutional factors affecting the relationship between wages and obesity as
instead suggested by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007).
We have also shown that this negative relationship holds even after controlling for decrease of productivity due to health
problems, agents’ myopic behavior, and provision of health insurance by employers, thus suggesting that residual wage
differences might be due to employer discrimination. Whether this discrimination could be more in the vein of ‘‘taste’’
discrimination (Becker, 1957) or of ‘‘statistical discrimination’’ (Aigner and Cain, 1977) requires a different analysis that is
beyond the scope of this work.32
Finally, in an attempt to control for endogeneity and to interpret our estimates as causal relationships, we have
employed an IVQR technique. Unfortunately, the results we obtain can hardly be considered as conclusive for two main
reasons: (i) we cannot prove that the instrument used is orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation, and (ii) the
construction of the instrument imposes a signiﬁcant and non-random cut in our sample that prevents us from comparing
the QR and IVQR estimates. In conclusion, in the light of this lack of robustness in the estimates, and the concern around the
instrument adopted, we suggest cautionwhen interpreting the relationship between obesity andwages as causal with the
ECHP data.
Why this discrimination exists in some quintiles and not in others or in all quantiles but with different intensity is not yet
clearly understood. Several laboratory studies (see Roehling, 1999) analyze common stereotypes of obeseworkers that prove
how obese workers are assumed to be lazy, less conscientious, less competent, sloppy, disagreeable, to lack self-discipline,
and emotionally unstable. All these reasons can equally explain wage discrimination as well as promotion, hiring and
termination of job. Unfortunately, to our knowledge no laboratory study or other empirical analyses exists that may explain
why discrimination may change across the wage distribution. This may partly due to the fact that no one has ever thought
about the possibility that discrimination exists only at certain levels of thewage distribution. In this sense, ourwork could be
a valid starting point for new research in this ﬁeld.
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32 In order to test this hypothesis we should have focusedmore on the role of starting wages as in Neumark (1999, p. 415), where the author clearly states
that ‘‘starting wages can potentially reﬂect either of the two types of discrimination – taste discrimination and statistical discrimination – in a fairly simple
way, and an analysis of starting wages leads to some straightforward tests of these alternative models of discrimination’’.
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Table A.1
Sample Selection from full ECHP sample, 1998–2001
Panel A: Sample size for OLS and QR Panel B: Sample size for IVQR
298,966 Initial sample, 1998–2001 298,966 Initial sample, 1998–2001
291,162 Observations (90,539 individuals) 291,162 Observations (90,539 individuals)
7804 Observations dropped with valid BMI in the initial sample 7804 Observations dropped with valid BMI in the initial sample
290,780 Selection for BMI between 15 and 50 290,780 Selection for BMI between 15 and 50
167 Observations dropped BMI <15 167 Observations dropped BMI <15
215 Observations dropped BMI >50 215 Observations dropped BMI >50
287,169 Selection for no pregnant women 287,169 Selection for no pregnant women
3611 Observations dropped 3611 Observations dropped
115,995 Selection for construction of sample with biological BMI
171,174 Observations dropped for
a. Respondent living alone (37,348)
b. Respondent living alone in couple without children
or in a couple with children aged <17 (122,768)
c. Respondent for which was not possible to calculate
the BMI because of one of the following relations
with the other household components (2728):
c1. Step/adopted/foster child
c2. Step/adopted/foster siblings
c3. Son/daughter in law
c4. Not related
d. Respondent for which was not possible to calculate
the BMI because of missing information about the
relation (8330)
217,248 Selection for sample aged 25–64 89,949 Selection for sample aged 25–64
16,718 Observations dropped <25 7316 Observations dropped <25
53,203 Observations dropped >64 18,730 Observations dropped >64
117,199 Selection for no part-time 46,387 Selection for no part-time
100,049 Observations dropped 43,562 Observations dropped
87,003 Selection for sample without outliers in the log hourly wage 31,630 Selections for sample without outliers in the log hourly wage
29,639 Observations dropped (log hourly wage < 1st percentile) 14,751 Observations dropped (log hourly wage < 1st percentile)
557 Observations dropped (log hourly wage < 99th percentile) 6 Observations dropped (log hourly wage > 99th percentile)
77,687 Selection for sample with no missing data in the covariates 30,100 Selection for sample with no missing data in the covariates
9316 Observations dropped 1530 Observations dropped
30,313 Final sub-sample women 10,792 Final sub-sample women
47,374 Final sub-sample men 19,308 Final sub-sample men
Table A.2
Descriptive statistics, pooled sample
Unrestricted sample Restricted sample
Women Men Women Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Log hourly wage 1.85 0.46 1.99 0.44 1.79 0.55 1.92 0.54
BMI 23.73 3.91 25.75 3.35 23.76 4.06 25.76 3.26
bBMI – – – – 24.72 3.23 24.53 3.29
Height 163.68 6.45 175.01 7.53 163.1 6.45 174.15 7.42
Weight 63.53 10.7 78.92 11.65 63.10 10.54 78.14 11.13
Sickness 1.26 4.52 0.77 3.36 1.05 4.10 0.75 3.35
Training 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Private 0.57 0.5 0.7 0.46 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45
Insurance 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Age 39.3 9.49 40.47 9.68 38.48 9.23 40.49 9.87
Couple 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.41
Children 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49
Primary 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.5
Secondary 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
Tertiary 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.4
Bad health 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Smoker 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.4 0.49
Professionals 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43
Clerks 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.38 0.48 0.2 0.4
AgrFishery 0.07 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.08 0.28 0.25 0.43
Elementary 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43
Agriculture 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18
Industry 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.41 0.49
Services 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.51 0.50
Obs. 30,313 47,374 10,792 19,308
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Table A.3
Descriptive statistics by country, unrestricted sample
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland Greece
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Log hourly wage 1.94 0.32 2.11 0.3 2.06 0.28 2.15 0.30 2.16 0.22 2.24 0.26 1.83 0.28 1.97 0.31 1.7 0.44 1.85 0.43
BMI 23.47 3.74 25.65 3.32 23.09 3.7 25.48 3.81 24.4 3.95 25.56 3.4 24.58 4.14 25.95 3.65 23.73 3.57 26.09 3.07
Height 166.45 6.05 177.5 7.09 165.63 6.18 177.39 7.03 166.91 5.91 179.9 6.86 164.72 6.31 178.03 6.6 164.98 5.38 175.96 6.67
Weight 65.03 11.02 80.88 11.82 63.33 10.53 80.24 13.15 68.01 11.68 82.74 12.03 66.68 11.66 82.38 13.37 64.55 9.84 80.76 10.2
Sickness 0.91 3.44 0.8 3.2 1.68 5.35 1.18 4.32 1.73 4.67 0.84 2.91 1.98 5.53 1.06 3.67 0.67 3.03 0.56 2.32
Training 0.57 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.89 0.32 0.83 0.38 0.79 0.4 0.73 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37
Private Sector 0.64 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.73 0.44 0.47 0.5 0.71 0.45 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.49
Insurance 0.2 0.4 0.24 0.43 0.48 0.5 0.58 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.2 0.4 0.86 0.35 0.85 0.35 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48
Age 38.93 9.17 40 9.22 38.08 8.83 40.64 9.17 41.45 9.64 42.19 10.07 42.56 9.23 41.24 9.3 37.95 8.63 40.89 9.85
Couple 0.6 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.8 0.4 0.88 0.32 0.87 0.34 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.41 0.68 0.47 0.72 0.45
Children 0.2 0.4 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.41 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
Primary 0.22 0.41 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.47
Secondary 0.67 0.47 0.8 0.4 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.53 0.5 0.54 0.5 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.5 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.48
Tertiary 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.57 0.5 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.46 0.5 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.3 0.46
Bad health 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Smoker 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.3 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.55 0.5
Professionals 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.46 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.34 0.48 0.28 0.45
Clerks 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.43 0.11 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.11 0.31 0.33 0.47 0.09 0.29 0.43 0.49 0.25 0.44
AgrFishery 0.05 0.21 0.3 0.46 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.11 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.27 0.23 0.42
Elementary 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.21 0.4 0.08 0.26 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41
Agriculture 0 0.06 0.01 0.11 0 0.05 0 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.09
Industry 0.19 0.4 0.46 0.5 0.09 0.28 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.3 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.47
Services 0.8 0.4 0.52 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.34 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.48 0.5 0.48 0.5 0.32 0.47 0.81 0.39 0.66 0.47
OBS. 2104 4466 2371 3838 2979 3722 4623 4731 2615 4473
Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Log hourly wage 2.09 0.4 2.25 0.39 1.96 0.38 2.03 0.35 1.46 0.56 1.57 0.5 1.94 0.49 2.04 0.45
BMI 23.84 3.81 25.65 3.39 22.74 3.41 25.29 3.05 24.42 4.35 25.85 3.18 23.06 3.58 26.2 3.48
Height 164.13 6.71 176.58 7.23 162.63 6.48 173.77 7.09 160.56 5.85 169.99 6.48 162.42 6.1 172.95 7.2
Weight 64.11 10.16 80.01 11.74 60.07 8.97 76.35 10.04 62.82 10.6 74.7 10.09 60.75 9.38 78.38 11.38
Sickness 1.01 4.06 0.43 2.28 1.13 4.16 0.63 2.9 1.15 4.8 0.83 4 1.01 4.29 0.74 3.66
Training 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.19 0.4 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.3 0.46
Private Sector 0.65 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.53 0.5 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.38 0.66 0.47 0.8 0.4
Insurance 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.5 0.46 0.5
Age 37.19 9.33 39.65 9.91 39.64 9.53 40.8 9.58 38.38 9.75 39.38 9.98 37.81 9.22 40.13 9.71
Couple 0.52 0.5 0.7 0.46 0.68 0.47 0.73 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.56 0.5 0.71 0.46
Children 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48
Primary 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.3 0.46 0.46 0.5 0.64 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.3 0.46 0.51 0.5
Secondary 0.43 0.5 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.5 0.42 0.49 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
Tertiary 0.3 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.4 0.13 0.33 0.49 0.5 0.3 0.46
Bad health 0.01 0.08 0 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Smoker 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.13 0.34 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.5
Professionals 0.38 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.21 0.4 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.44
V
.
A
tella
et
a
l./E
co
n
o
m
ics
a
n
d
H
u
m
a
n
B
io
lo
g
y
6
(2
0
0
8
)
3
0
5
–
3
2
9
3
2
3
Table A.3 (Continued )
Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Clerks 0.42 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.35 0.48 0.16 0.37
AgrFishery 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.38 0.09 0.28 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.05 0.21 0.3 0.46
Elementary 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.22 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44
Agriculture 0 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21
Industry 0.2 0.4 0.39 0.49 0.19 0.4 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.5 0.16 0.36 0.44 0.5
Services 0.8 0.4 0.59 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.55 0.5 0.69 0.46 0.47 0.5 0.83 0.38 0.51 0.5
OBS. 1617 3022 5327 8802 4895 6811 3782 7509
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Table A.4
Quantile regressions
Women Men
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
Austria
Obesity 0.030 0.018 0.021 0.065** 0.050* 0.016 0.039*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.074***
Overweight 0.019 0.024 0.005 0.014 0.017 0.024* 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.027** 0.043***
Underweight 0.052 0.059** 0.023 0.015 0.004 0.521*** 0.465*** 0.383*** 0.249*** 0.216***
Insurance 0.036 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.108*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.111***
Training 0.099*** 0.084*** 0.066*** 0.030** 0.025 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.048***
Private sector 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.016 0.044** 0.006 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.057***
Sickness 0.047 0.018 0.031 0.019 0.056 0.098* 0.039 0.012 0.128*** 0.127**
Bad health 0.057 0.062* 0.016 0.003 0.025 0.095** 0.061** 0.118*** 0.032 0.147***
Age 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.008 0.013**
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000
Couple 0.029 0.017 0.003 0.028** 0.030** 0.002 0.002 0.062*** 0.026* 0.033*
Children 0.048* 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.023 0.012 0.017* 0.017** 0.007 0.007
Secondary 0.035 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.038* 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.122***
Tertiary 0.101** 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.068** 0.039 0.147*** 0.192*** 0.199*** 0.287*** 0.413***
Smoker 0.039* 0.014 0.020* 0.005 0.001 0.063*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.029** 0.028**
Clerks 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.166*** 0.236*** 0.245*** 0.185*** 0.170*** 0.194*** 0.133*** 0.130***
AgrFishery 0.243*** 0.296*** 0.362*** 0.531*** 0.560*** 0.155*** 0.177*** 0.215*** 0.221*** 0.216***
Elementary 0.321*** 0.335*** 0.350*** 0.484*** 0.518*** 0.253*** 0.276*** 0.294*** 0.288*** 0.311***
Agriculture 0.049 0.036 0.017 0.031 0.013 0.086* 0.038 0.054** 0.049 0.109
Industry 0.038 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.034**
Constant 0.921*** 1.218*** 1.329*** 1.670*** 1.753*** 1.326*** 1.443*** 1.662*** 1.792*** 1.705***
OBS. 2104 4466
Belgium
Obesity 0.01 0.034 0.067** 0.013 0.001 0.051** 0.039** 0.016 0.018 0.019
Overweight 0.015 0.001 0.018 0.007 0.031 0.032*** 0.01 0.020** 0.005 0.014
Underweight 0.042 0.072*** 0.038 0.001 0.029 0.014 0.110** 0.053 0.016 0.019
Insurance 0.059*** 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.085*** 0.071***
Training 0.094*** 0.108*** 0.082*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.096*** 0.076*** 0.059*** 0.056***
Private Sector 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.02 0.017 0.002 0.002
Sickness 0.001 0.011 0.020 0.016 0.044 0.087* 0.021 0.016 0.007 0.003
Bad health 0.028 0.082** 0.109** 0.021 0.009 0.020 0.061 0.062* 0.071** 0.074*
Age 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.037***
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Couple 0.010 0.027** 0.002 0.015 0.012 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.095*** 0.115*** 0.095***
Children 0.019 0.048*** 0.030** 0.036*** 0.038** 0.000 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.037***
Secondary 0.048** 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.037 0.037** 0.033** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.086***
Tertiary 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.201*** 0.187*** 0.157*** 0.164*** 0.200*** 0.254*** 0.256***
Smoker 0.022 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.012
Clerks 0.066*** 0.085*** 0.109*** 0.095*** 0.103*** 0.067*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.058*** 0.075***
AgrFishery 0.155** 0.198*** 0.147** 0.116** 0.184** 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.096*** 0.082*** 0.102***
Elementary 0.159*** 0.189*** 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.197*** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.045** 0.066***
Agriculture 0.007 0.065 0.149 0.050 0.036 0.101** 0.136 0.212*** 0.323*** 0.379***
Industry 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.034 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.037** 0.002 0.010
Constant 0.832*** 0.939*** 1.222*** 1.152*** 1.357*** 0.963*** 0.995*** 1.134*** 1.091*** 1.057***
OBS. 2371 3838
Denmark
Obesity 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.039** 0.027 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.022
Overweight 0.002 0.007 0.016* 0.008 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.014** 0.01 0.012
Underweight 0.069*** 0.023 0.006 0.024 0.039 0.047 0.008 0.099** 0.05 0.023
Insurance 0.017** 0.027*** 0.025** 0.021* 0.015 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.041***
Training 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.031** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.020** 0.016 0.021
Private sector 0.019*** 0.016** 0.040*** 0.077*** 0.105*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.079*** 0.086***
Sickness 0.002 0.015 0.033 0.041 0.001 0.076 0.019 0.099** 0.125*** 0.056
Bad health 0.081*** 0.023 0.041 0.061 0.059* 0.357*** 0.123* 0.094*** 0.140*** 0.158***
Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.008
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
Couple 0.067*** 0.041*** 0.023** 0.001 0.007 0.048*** 0.016 0.019* 0.008 0.008
Children 0.005 0.003 0.017* 0.029** 0.022** 0.021 0.027* 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.053***
Secondary 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.073*** 0.024 0.022 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.086*** 0.067***
Tertiary 0.220*** 0.206*** 0.150*** 0.093*** 0.087*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.135***
Smoker 0.016** 0.017** 0.015* 0.017* 0.012 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.009 0.000
Clerks 0.089*** 0.098*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.142*** 0.111*** 0.125*** 0.152*** 0.188*** 0.186***
AgrFishery 0.073*** 0.063** 0.046 0.103** 0.121*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.124*** 0.177*** 0.200***
Elementary 0.142*** 0.157*** 0.209*** 0.241*** 0.273*** 0.140*** 0.163*** 0.192*** 0.220*** 0.215***
Agriculture 0.157*** 0.076 0.141** 0.185*** 0.138*** 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.094*** 0.012 0.028
Industry 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.025 0.044*** 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.022** 0.012
Constant 1.459*** 1.549*** 1.577*** 1.503*** 1.548*** 0.946*** 1.270*** 1.732*** 1.899*** 2.054***
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Table A.4 (Continued )
Women Men
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
OBS. 2979 3722
Finland
Obesity 0.103*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.042** 0.046*** 0.019 0.005 0.010 0.028
Overweight 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.013 0.001 0.006 0.019* 0.008 0.005
Underweight 0.002 0.011 0.039 0.075*** 0.010 0.362*** 0.177 0.236*** 0.266*** 0.269**
Insurance 0.122*** 0.085*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.148*** 0.111*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.047**
Training 0.134*** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.116***
Private sector 0.001 0.004 0.020** 0.035*** 0.053*** 0.005 0.006 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.035**
Sickness 0.044* 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.005 0.018
Bad health 0.005 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.058** 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.013 0.025
Age 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.036***
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Couple 0.002 0.022*** 0.017* 0.018* 0.024* 0.062*** 0.039** 0.043*** 0.023 0.022
Children 0.01 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.048*** 0.037** 0.011 0.009 0.007
Secondary 0.034** 0.025*** 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.034** 0.037** 0.053**
Tertiary 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.167*** 0.206*** 0.160*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.189*** 0.208***
Smoker 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.019* 0.014 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.042***
Clerks 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.148*** 0.177*** 0.174***
AgrFishery 0.175*** 0.141*** 0.153*** 0.138*** 0.184*** 0.070*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.130***
Elementary 0.132*** 0.160*** 0.200*** 0.216*** 0.226*** 0.122*** 0.132*** 0.148*** 0.126*** 0.091***
Agriculture 0.080** 0.011 0.003 0.029 0.010 0.025 0.086* 0.034 0.093** 0.100**
Industry 0.017 0.020* 0.011 0.034** 0.042** 0.017 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.026
Constant 0.667*** 0.910*** 1.253*** 1.366*** 1.363*** 0.764*** 0.880*** 1.080*** 1.203*** 1.077***
OBS. 4623 4731
Greece
Obesity 0.029 0.042 0.057** 0.005 0.006 0.044* 0.059*** 0.019 0.001 0.000
Overweight 0.003 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.018 0.034*** 0.053***
Underweight 0.016 0.024 0.018 0.045 0.000 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.023 0.010 0.241***
Insurance 0.040** 0.023* 0.022* 0.004 0.010 0.031* 0.034** 0.026** 0.004 0.004
Training 0.002 0.026 0.052*** 0.033** 0.083*** 0.109*** 0.093*** 0.096*** 0.117*** 0.114***
Private sector 0.243*** 0.247*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.189*** 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.071***
Sickness 0.038 0.021 0.100* 0.024 0.070 0.176** 0.035 0.049 0.011 0.116
Bad health 0.214*** 0.206*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.227*** 0.148** 0.160** 0.046 0.061
Age 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.067***
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
Couple 0.056*** 0.026 0.029** 0.004 0.013 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.068*** 0.046** 0.038
Children 0.047** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.032* 0.042** 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.098*** 0.080***
Secondary 0.165*** 0.176*** 0.145*** 0.135*** 0.165*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.165*** 0.150*** 0.140***
Tertiary 0.346*** 0.376*** 0.414*** 0.481*** 0.514*** 0.225*** 0.216*** 0.287*** 0.335*** 0.332***
Smoker 0.002 0.022 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.016 0.003 0.006
Clerks 0.092*** 0.083*** 0.140*** 0.193*** 0.230*** 0.148*** 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.238*** 0.276***
AgrFishery 0.260*** 0.208*** 0.231*** 0.339*** 0.373*** 0.221*** 0.238*** 0.257*** 0.292*** 0.352***
Elementary 0.278*** 0.260*** 0.281*** 0.285*** 0.315*** 0.182*** 0.213*** 0.220*** 0.254*** 0.293***
Agriculture 0.131** 0.144*** 0.110** 0.058 0.033 0.237*** 0.163*** 0.150*** 0.134*** 0.160**
Industry 0.113*** 0.080*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.050** 0.108*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.030* 0.045*
Constant 0.025 0.009 0.396*** 0.407*** 0.561*** 0.352*** 0.295** 0.262** 0.324*** 0.405**
OBS. 2615 4473
Ireland
Obesity 0.064** 0.046* 0.035** 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.014 0.023 0.038 0.058***
Overweight 0.047** 0.007 0.016* 0.037 0.022 0.020 0.012 0.014 0.004 0.022**
Underweight 0.055 0.021 0.016 0.094 0.119 0.089 0.005 0.131* 0.319*** 0.350***
Insurance 0.074*** 0.015 0.003 0.045 0.036 0.024 0.040 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.083***
Training 0.048*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.040*** 0.010 0.024*
Private sector 0.208*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.247*** 0.261*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.200*** 0.192*** 0.163***
Sickness 0.146*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.104 0.151** 0.128* 0.143 0.210*** 0.124* 0.130***
Bad health 0.035 0.050 0.151*** 0.116 0.059 0.028 0.059 0.027 0.025 0.051
Age 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.022** 0.013 0.028*** 0.024** 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.026***
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Couple 0.028 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.016 0.007 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.156*** 0.079*** 0.102***
Children 0.001 0.023 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.014 0.016 0.002 0.020 0.026**
Secondary 0.121*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.134*** 0.145*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.121*** 0.139***
Tertiary 0.254*** 0.305*** 0.295*** 0.288*** 0.295*** 0.235*** 0.243*** 0.295*** 0.329*** 0.344***
Smoker 0.006 0.011 0.040*** 0.000 0.002 0.044** 0.034 0.032*** 0.013 0.006
Clerks 0.222*** 0.234*** 0.250*** 0.310*** 0.326*** 0.144*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.157*** 0.160***
AgrFishery 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.205*** 0.372*** 0.453*** 0.156*** 0.178*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.160***
Elementary 0.218*** 0.245*** 0.294*** 0.417*** 0.445*** 0.221*** 0.245*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.263***
Agriculture 0.250*** 0.334*** 0.023 0.067 0.004 0.515*** 0.370*** 0.074** 0.003 0.058**
Industry 0.034 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.121***
Constant 1.511*** 1.365*** 1.410*** 1.867*** 2.127*** 1.258*** 1.481*** 1.745*** 1.681*** 1.681***
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Table A.4 (Continued )
Women Men
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
OBS. 1617 3022
Italy
Obesity 0.065** 0.056** 0.030 0.050** 0.080*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.033*** 0.030** 0.021
Overweight 0.032*** 0.026** 0.024*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.013** 0.018** 0.024**
Underweight 0.051** 0.026 0.024 0.045** 0.041** 0.233*** 0.220*** 0.192*** 0.136** 0.143*
Insurance 0.026** 0.027*** 0.011 0.002 0.027** 0.003 0.012 0.018** 0.013 0.023**
Training 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.111*** 0.082*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.067***
Private sector 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.094*** 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.032*** 0.006 0.021*
Sickness 0.034 0.019 0.025 0.046 0.029 0.012 0.043 0.060* 0.071** 0.008
Bad health 0.103*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.057** 0.046* 0.065*** 0.057** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.048*
Age 0.050*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.019***
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000**
Couple 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.014 0.010 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.073*** 0.090*** 0.098***
Children 0.018 0.015 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.028** 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.044***
Secondary 0.196*** 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.100*** 0.083*** 0.100*** 0.113***
Tertiary 0.295*** 0.248*** 0.299*** 0.455*** 0.456*** 0.230*** 0.243*** 0.300*** 0.446*** 0.496***
Smoker 0.014 0.011 0.014* 0.022** 0.023** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.010 0.006 0.016
Clerks 0.043*** 0.078*** 0.130*** 0.242*** 0.281*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.128***
AgrFishery 0.121*** 0.157*** 0.201*** 0.318*** 0.357*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.173*** 0.231*** 0.250***
Elementary 0.112*** 0.133*** 0.194*** 0.337*** 0.406*** 0.108*** 0.121*** 0.162*** 0.197*** 0.215***
Agriculture 0.382*** 0.400*** 0.265*** 0.017 0.000 0.269*** 0.211*** 0.167*** 0.087*** 0.111***
Industry 0.070*** 0.049*** 0.029** 0.020 0.017 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.024*** 0.018* 0.002
Constant 0.470*** 1.007*** 1.249*** 1.482*** 1.697*** 0.523*** 0.709*** 1.236*** 1.476*** 1.623***
OBS. 5327 8802
Portugal
Obesity 0.007 0.002 0.038* 0.031 0.034 0.062*** 0.025 0.028* 0.039 0.036
Overweight 0.016 0.025** 0.023** 0.019 0.037** 0.017 0.031** 0.018* 0.030** 0.039**
Underweight 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.159* 0.097 0.058 0.020 0.049
Insurance 0.026* 0.037** 0.022 0.030** 0.066*** 0.035** 0.063*** 0.087*** 0.100*** 0.130***
Training 0.087*** 0.102*** 0.147*** 0.133*** 0.104*** 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 0.128***
Private sector 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.223*** 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.103*** 0.063*** 0.051*** 0.013 0.007
Sickness 0.043 0.046 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.057 0.012 0.022 0.024 0.032
Bad health 0.015 0.019 0.050** 0.072*** 0.090*** 0.132*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.160***
Age 0.011** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.036***
Age squared 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Couple 0.091*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.023 0.079*** 0.099*** 0.113*** 0.141*** 0.151***
Children 0.015 0.012 0.019 0.026** 0.003 0.030** 0.022 0.035*** 0.026 0.031
Secondary 0.123*** 0.161*** 0.252*** 0.337*** 0.334*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.242*** 0.222*** 0.211***
Tertiary 0.594*** 0.558*** 0.652*** 0.654*** 0.634*** 0.540*** 0.646*** 0.637*** 0.652*** 0.608***
Smoker 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.113*** 0.134*** 0.075*** 0.026** 0.017 0.035*** 0.023* 0.004
Clerks 0.218*** 0.257*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.318*** 0.236*** 0.224*** 0.251*** 0.208*** 0.234***
AgrFishery 0.273*** 0.350*** 0.407*** 0.557*** 0.611*** 0.246*** 0.228*** 0.310*** 0.329*** 0.371***
Elementary 0.286*** 0.354*** 0.397*** 0.486*** 0.500*** 0.313*** 0.281*** 0.342*** 0.353*** 0.403***
Agriculture 0.020 0.022 0.059** 0.083** 0.135*** 0.335*** 0.285*** 0.218*** 0.089** 0.161***
Industry 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.060*** 0.097*** 0.054** 0.077*** 0.027* 0.022* 0.052*** 0.062***
Constant 0.973*** 1.106*** 1.197*** 1.196*** 1.246*** 0.610*** 0.615*** 0.761*** 0.714*** 0.978***
OBS. 4895 6811
Spain
Obesity 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.105*** 0.011 0.039** 0.021 0.016 0.001
Overweight 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.013 0.033 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.015 0.008
Underweight 0.071 0.044 0.006 0.050* 0.051 0.147** 0.249** 0.063 0.045 0.062
Private sector 0.184*** 0.196*** 0.167*** 0.143*** 0.122*** 0.191*** 0.148*** 0.061*** 0.016 0.042***
Insurance 0.13ß2*** 0.098*** 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.063***
Training 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 0.114***
Sickness 0.088 0.045 0.030 0.016 0.034 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.060 0.035 0.038
Bad health 0.016 0.021 0.007 0.033 0.007 0.065 0.088** 0.144*** 0.195*** 0.193***
Age 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.031***
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000***
Couple 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.033*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.073***
Children 0.081*** 0.019 0.030* 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.029** 0.027** 0.033* 0.037***
Secondary 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.145*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.125*** 0.154***
Tertiary 0.237*** 0.244*** 0.250*** 0.262*** 0.223*** 0.195*** 0.189*** 0.215*** 0.241*** 0.250***
Smoker 0.005 0.022 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.038** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.023** 0.032* 0.034***
Clerks 0.265*** 0.291*** 0.324*** 0.358*** 0.355*** 0.188*** 0.193*** 0.261*** 0.247*** 0.213***
AgrFishery 0.346*** 0.406*** 0.484*** 0.563*** 0.525*** 0.215*** 0.233*** 0.318*** 0.340*** 0.321***
Elementary 0.337*** 0.368*** 0.387*** 0.461*** 0.488*** 0.263*** 0.291*** 0.376*** 0.375*** 0.374***
Agriculture 0.099 0.097 0.172*** 0.096** 0.093 0.253*** 0.216*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.212***
Industry 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.117*** 0.132*** 0.092*** 0.158*** 0.130*** 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.039***
Constant 0.093 0.393** 0.641*** 0.880*** 0.911*** 0.903*** 1.064*** 1.341*** 1.447*** 1.383***
V. Atella et al. / Economics and Human Biology 6 (2008) 305–329 327
References
Aigner, D.J., Cain, G.C., 1977. Statistical theories of discrimination in the labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30, 175–187.
Amemiya, T., 1982. Two stage least absolute deviations estimators. Econometrica 50, 689–711.
Andreyeva, T., Michaud, P.C., van Soest, A., 2005. Obesity and health in Europeans ages 50 and above. RAND Labor and Population Working Paper WR-331,
Santa Monica.
Averett, S., Korenman, S., 1996. The economic reality of the beauty myth. Journal of Human Resources 31, 304–330.
Baum, C., Ford, W., 2004. The wage effects of obesity: a longitudinal study. Health Economics 13, 885–899.
Becker, G.S., 1957. The Economics of Discrimination. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Behrman, J., Rosenzweig, M., 2001. The returns to increasing body weight. Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 01-052.
Bhattacharya, J., Bundorf, K., 2005. The incidence of the healthcare costs of obesity. NBER Working Paper No. 11303.
Blundell, R., Powell, J.L., 2003. Endogeneity in nonparametric and semiparametric regression models. In: Hansen, L. (Ed.), Advances in Econometrics, Eighth
World Congress. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Blundell, R., Powell, J.L., 2005. Censored regression quantiles with endogenous regressors. Journal of Econometrics 141, 65–83.
Buchinsky, M., 2001. Quantile regression with sample selection: Estimating women’s return to education in the U.S. Empirical Economics 26, 87–113.
Brunello, G., d’Hombres, B., 2007. Does body weight affect wages: evidence from Europe. Economics and Human Biology 5, 1–19.
Burkhauser, R.V., Cawley, J., 2008. Beyond BMI: The value of more accurate measures of fatness and obesity in social science research. Journal of Health
Economics 27, 519–529.
Cawley, J., 2000. An instrumental variables approach to measuring the effect of obesity on employment disability. Health Services Research 35, 1159–1179.
Cawley, J., 2004. The impact of obesity on wages. Journal of Human Resources 39, 451–474.
Cawley, J., Danziger, S., 2005. Obesity as a barrier to employment and earnings for current and former welfare recipients. Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 24, 727–743.
Cawley, J., Grabkal, M.M., Lillard, D.R., 2005. A comparison of the relationships between obesity and earnings in the U.S. and Germany. Journal of Applied
Social Science Studies 125, 119–129.
Chen, X., Linton, O., Van Keilegom, I., 2003. Estimation of semiparametric models when the criterion function is not smooth. Econometrica 71, 1591–1608.
Chernozhukov, V., Hansen, C., 2005. An IV model of quantile treatment effects. Econometrica 73, 254–261.
Chernozhukov, V., Hansen, C., 2006. Instrumental quantile regression inference for structural and treatment effect models. Journal of Econometrics 132,
491–525.
Chesher, A.D., 2003. Identiﬁcation in nonseparable models. Econometrica 71, 1405–1441.
Chou, S.-Y., Grossman, M., Saffer, H., 2002. An economic analysis of adult obesity: results from the behavioral risk factor surveillance system. NBERWorking
Paper No. 9247.
Conley, D., Glauber, R., 2007. Gender, body mass, and socioeconomic status: new evidence from the PSID. In: Bolin, K., Cawley, J. (Eds.), The Economics of
Obesity. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, vol. 17. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 253–275.
Cutler, D.M., Glaeser, E.L., Shapiro, J.M., 2003. Why have Americans become more obese? Journal of Economic Perspective 17, 93–118.
Evans, W., Montgomery, E., 1994. Education and health: where there’s smoke there’s an instrument. NBER Working Paper No. 4949.
Fahr, R., 2006. Wage Effect of social norms: evidence of deviations from peers’ body-mass in Europe. IZA Working Paper 2323.
Finkelstein, E.A., Ruhm, C.J., Kosa, K.M., 2005. Economic causes and consequences of obesity. Annual Review of Public Health 26, 239–257.
Freeman, B.R., 2008. Labor market institutions around the world. Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 844.
Garcia, J., Quintana-Domeque, C., 2006. Income and body mass index in Europe. Mimeo.
Table A.5
Trade union density, bargaining governability and EPL
Union density (%) Bargaining governability EPL strictness
Austria 37 3 2.3
Belgium 56 1 2.5
Denmark 74 4 1.5
Finland 76 4 2.1
Greece 27 (a) 3.5
Ireland 38 1 1.1
Italy 35 1 3.4
Portugal 24 3 3.7
Spain 15 3 3.1
Notes: Trade union density is deﬁned as the proportion of the labor force belonging to a trade union (for details see OECD, 2004). Bargaining governability is
an indicator of vertical co-ordination and is a measure of the extent to which collective contracts are effectively followed at lower levels. This indicator
assumes the following values: 4 when collective agreement are legally enforceable and there is an automatic peace obligation during the validity of the
agreement; 3 when collective agreement are legally enforceable and there are widespread but optional peace of obligation clauses in agreements; 2 when
there is legal enforceability, but no effective tradition or practice of peace of obligation clauses; 1 when neither of the above conditions are effectively
present. For further detail on bargaining governability, see OECD (2004) and Traxler et al. (2001). The EPL is a summary indicator, obtained as weighted
average of three main components: protection against individual dismissal of a regular employee, protection against individual dismissal of a temporary
employee and protection against collective dismissals. For further details on EPL see OECD (1999).
Table A.4 (Continued )
Women Men
að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ að15thÞ að25thÞ að50thÞ að75thÞ að85thÞ
OBS. 3782 7509
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
V. Atella et al. / Economics and Human Biology 6 (2008) 305–329328
Garcia, J., Quintana-Domeque, C., 2007. Obesity, employment and wages in europe. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 17, 187–
217.
Gortmaker, S.L., Must, A., Perrin, J.M., Sobol, A.M., Dietz, W.H., 1993. Social and economic consequences of overweight among adolescents and young adults.
New England Journal of Medicine 329, 1008–1012.
Greve, J., 2007. Obesity and labor market outcomes: new danish evidence. Aarhus School of Business Working Paper 07-13.
Grilo, C.M., Pogue-Geile, F.M., 1991. The Nature of environmental inﬂuences on weight and obesity: a behavior genetic analysis. Psychological Bulletin 110,
520–537.
Hamermesh, D., Biddle, J., 1994. Beauty and the labor market. American Economic Review 84, 1174–1194.
Hong, H., Tamer, E., 2003. Inference in censored models with endogenous regressors. Econometrica 71, 905–932.
Honore´, B.E., Hu, L., 2004. On the performance of some robust instrumental variables estimators. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 22, 30–39.
Kline, B., Tobias, J.L. The wages of BMI: Bayesian analysis of a skewed treatment-response model with nonparametric endogeneity. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, in press.
Komlos, J., Smith, P.K., Bogin, B., 2004. Obesity and the rate of time preference: is there a connection? Journal of Biosociological Sciences 36, 209–219.
Lacobsen, J.P., Pearce, J.W., Rosenbloom, J.L., 1999. The effects of childbearing onmarriedwomen’s labor supply and earnings: using twins births as a natural
experiment. Journal of Human Resources 34, 449–474.
Lakdawalla, D., Philipson, T., 2002. The growth of obesity and technological change: a theoretical and empirical analysis. NBER Working Paper No. 8946.
Lakdawalla, D., Philipson, T., 2007. Labor supply and weight. Journal of Human Resources 42, 85–116.
Lee, S., 2007. Endogeneity in quantile regression models: a control function approach. Journal of Econometrics 141, 1131–1158.
Loh, E., 1993. The economic effects of physical appearance. Social Science Quarterly 74, 420–438.
Loureiro, M.L., Nayga, R.M., 2005. International dimensions of obesity and overweight related problems: an economic perspective. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 87, 1147–1153.
Lundborg, P., Bolin, K., Ho¨jga˚rd, S., Lindgren, B., 2007. Obesity and occupational attainment among the 50+ of Europe. In: Bolin, K., Cawley, J. (Eds.), The
Economics of Obesity. Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, vol. 17. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 219–252.
Ma, L., Koenker, R., 2006. Quantile regression methods for recursive structural equation models. Journal of Econometrics 134, 471–506.
Melly B., Huber, M., 2007. Sample selection, heteroscedasticity, and quantile regression. Mimeo.
Mobius, M., Rosenblat, T.S., 2004. Why beauty matters. American Economic Review 96, 222–235.
Molarius, A., Seidell, J., Kuulasmaa, K., Dobson, A., Sans, S., 1997. Smoking and relative body weight: an international perspective from the WHO MONICA
project. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 51, 252–260.
Morris, S., 2006. Body mass index and occupational attainment. Journal of Health Economics 25, 347–364.
Morris, S., 2007. The impact of obesity on employment. Labour Economics 14, 413–433.
Neumark, D., 1999. Wage differentials by race and sex: the roles of taste discrimination and labor market information. Industrial Relations 38, 414–445.
OECD, 1999. Employment protection and labour market performance. In: OECD Employment Outlook, pp. 48–132 (Chapter 2). http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/9/46/2079974.pdf.
OECD, 2004. Wage setting institutions and outcomes. In: OECD Employment Outlook, pp. 127–181 (Chapter 3). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/3/
34846881.pdf.
Pagan, J., Davila, P., 1997. Obesity, occupational attainment and earnings. Social Science Quarterly 78, 756–770.
Peracchi, F., 2002. The European community household panel: a review. Empirical Economics 27, 63–90.
Persico, N., Postlewaite, A., Silverman, D., 2004. The effect of adolescent experience on labor market outcomes: the case of height. Journal of Political
Economy 112, 1019–1053.
Philipson, T., Posner, R. 1999. The long run growth in obesity as a function of technological change. NBER Working Paper No. 7423.
Powell, J.L., 1983. The asymptotic normality of two-stage least absolute deviations estimators. Econometrica 51, 1569–1576.
Register, C.A., Williams, D., 1990. Wage effects of obesity among young workers. Social Science Quarterly 71, 130–141.
Roehling, M.V., 1999. Weight-based discrimination in employment: psychological and legal aspects. Personnel Psychology 52, 969–1017.
Sanz de Galdeano, A., 2005. The obesity epidemic in Europe. IZA Working Paper No. 1814.
Sanz de Galdeano, A., 2007. An economic analysis of obesity in Europe: health, medical care and absenteeism costs. FEDEA Working Paper No. 07-38.
Sargent, J., Blanchﬂower, D., 1994. Obesity and stature in adolescence and earnings in young adulthood. Analysis of a British birth cohort. Archives of
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 148, 681–687.
Shimokawa, S., 2008. The labour market impact of body weight in China: a semiparametric analysis. Applied Economics 40, 949–968.
Sousa, S., 2005. Does size matter? A propensity score approach to the effect of BMI on labour market outcomes. Paper presented at ESPE 2005. Paris.
Staiger, D., Stock, J.H., 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica 65, 557–586.
Thomas, D., Frankenberg, E., 2002. The measurement and interpretation of health in social surveys. In: Murray, C., Salomon, J., Mathers, C., Lopez, A.
(Eds.), Summary Measures of Population Health. World Health Organization, Geneva.
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., Kittel, B., 2001. National Labour Regulations in Internationalized Markets: A comparative Study of Institutions, Change and
Performance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Wardle, J., Grifﬁth, J., 2001. Socioeconomic status and weight control practices in British adults. Journal of Epidemiology Community Health 55, 185–190.
WHO, 2003. Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases. WHO Technical Report No. 916.
WHO, 2006. Nutrition, Physical Activity and Prevention of Obesity: Recent Policy Developments in the WHO European Region. Report in progress-
ﬁnalization expected based on review at the WHO European Ministerial Conference on Counteracting Obesity.
Wooldridge, J., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
V. Atella et al. / Economics and Human Biology 6 (2008) 305–329 329
